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The Monetary Approach to Official Reserves and 
the Foreign Exchange Rate in France, 1962-74: 
Some Structural Estimates 
By JACQUES MELITZ AND HENRI STERDYNIAK* 
Any test of the monetary approach 
centered on the period of fixed exchange rates 
would now be predominantly of historical 
interest. At the time of this study, however, 
experience with flexible exchangc rates was 
still too short to permit concentr.ating econ- 
ometric analysis exclusively on this more 
recent system. Caught in this net, we have 
attempted an analysis of official reserves and 
the foreign exchange rate in lIr;unce covering 
both fixed and flexible exchange rates, that is, 
thirty-nine quarters of tixed rates, 1962.1- 
1971.3, and thirteen quartcrs of flexible rates, 
1971.4-1974.4. The cost is the presence of 
errors in our simultaneous equation estimates 
of the exchange rate during the period of 
fixed rates. But the benefit is an econometric 
analysis founded on fifty-two observations, 
and yet covering three years of flexible rates. 
Since the errors in the estimates of the 
exchange rate under fixed rates are quite 
moderate, the cost would seem to be worth the 
benefit. 
The most important characteristic of our 
work is the use of a detailed structural model 
of bank credit and money in testing the 
monetary approach. The early tests of this 
approach simplified the structure of the 
monetary system to the utmost and consid- 
ered the domestic source component of the 
reserve base (or the total base minus official 
foreign reserves) and the money multiplier as 
exogenous.' But there is really no logical basis 
for these restrictive assumptions. The mone- 
tary approach states that the demand and 
supply of money in a "small" country 
together determine 1) money, and 2) official 
reserves or the foreign exchange rate or the 
attainable combinations of the two, depend- 
ing upon fixed, floating, or managed 
exchange rates. Nothing but a correct specifi- 
cation of the conditions for monetary equilib- 
rium can provide a basis for testing this 
proposition. 
We also deviate from the tendency in the 
literature on the monetary approach to 
suppose that any convenient measure of 
money will do. Based on this attitude, there 
have been many tests of the monetary 
approach using simply the reserve base as the 
measure of money, even though this aggre- 
gate, consisting of currency plus an arbitrary 
fraction of deposits, is inappropriate in 
analyzing the monetary behavior of firms and 
households.2 In justifying this measure in a 
well-known econometric work, Pentti Kouri 
and Michael Porter nmerely say: "The essen- 
tial features of the model [would not be] 
substantially changed by incorporating a 
more complete banking system" (p. 448). But 
not only does this fail to meet the criticism, it 
also neglects the fact that the monetary 
approach can give rise to conflicting estimates 
of changes in official reserves and the 
exchange rate depending on the money 
measure.3 There is no way of assessing the 
seriousness of this last objection without test- 
ing. In this work we shall examine the extent 
to which varying and tenable money measures 
in France yield convergent results. 
In spite of these deviations from the litera- 
ture, we may be said to adhere to a strict 
*Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes 
Economiques, Paris. 
'See, for example, the works of J. Richard Zecher, 
Hans Genberg, and Donna Bean. 
2Harry Johnson showed the way in his seminal article. 
3Nonetheless, Kouri and Porter invite us to take 
seriously their point estimates of the extent to which 
changes in official reserves neutralize domestic monetary 
policy actions in four different countries under fixed 
exchange rates. With respect to the issue of choice of 
money aggregate, see Rudiger Dornbusch, p. 257, fn. I. 
One important article anticipating Kouri and Porter's 
work about one decade earlier is by Juirg Niehans. 
818 
This content downloaded from 193.54.67.94 on Thu, 17 Jul 2014 09:05:49 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
VOL. 69 NO. 5 MELITZ AND STERDYNIAK: FOREIGN EXCHANGE 819 
version of the monetary approach. Only 
monetary influences enter into our analysis. 
We take real income as given and ignore the 
balance of trade and the terms of trade. Any 
use of the trade balance as a datum in 
determining the flow of official reserves 
would limit the analysis to the explanation of 
movements in reserves corresponding to 
foreign capital movements. By eschewing 
information about absorption or the terms of 
trade-anything to do with imports or exports 
of commodities as such--we avoid this 
restriction and examine a particularly strong 
version of the monetary approach, in accord- 
ance with Harry Johnson's influential paper. 
Following Kouri and Porter, our effort 
might also be expected to show the extent to 
which movements in official reserves offset 
the impact of policy changes in the reserve 
base. However, there are no open market 
operations in France; the basic monetary 
instrument is bank rate, or more precisely, the 
daily price of refinancing at the Bank of 
France (le taux de l'argent au jour le jour). 
Thus the only question we can investigate 
which corresponds to Kouri and Porter's 
problem is the extent to which a fiscal deficit 
is offset by an outflow of official reserves. In 
fact, we find this offset to be very high, on the 
order of 70 percent within a year (a reason- 
able figure since practically all fiscal deficits 
were financed directly through the central 
bank during most of the study period). The 
offset also has only diminished slightly-by 
about 4 percent since the abandonment of 
fixed rates in late 1971. In general, the regime 
of flexible rates has brought little change in 
the magnitude of the influences on money and 
official reserves in France. There is simply a 
new and high sensitivity to the dollar-deutsch- 
mark exchange rate. We shall conclude, on 
the basis of the analysis, that the monetary 
approach is quite useful, but does not 
explain enough to warrant exclusive reliance 
upon it. 
1. The Model 
The general underlying conception of 
money-stock determination in this work has 
important links to Karl Brunner and Allan 
Meltzer (1966, 1968). On the one side, 
commercial banks demand earning assets; on 
the other, firms and households supply such 
assets to the banks. There results a quantity of 
earning assets and a price. The quantity of 
commercial bank earning assets, together 
with the banks' desired excess legal reserves, 
their desired borrowing from the central 
bank, the legal reserve requirement, and an 
accounting identity yield commercial bank 
deposits. An equilibrium relationship between 
bank deposits on the one side and government 
monetary debt on the other, then permits 
deriving the money stock if money is viewed 
as the sum of commercial bank deposits and 
the monetary liabilities of the government (or 
as the sum of these deposits plus currency, 
postal checking deposits, and state savings 
deposits). If money should be understood 
differently, then some other deposit ratios 
would enter the analysis. 
Adapting this fundamental framework to 
France is easy in one respect, complicated in 
another. What makes it simple is that the 
earning assets of French commercial banks 
consist entirely of loans, and not securities. 
The banks demand no securities since they 
can use eligible paper for discount at the 
central bank (effets mobilisables) to satisfy 
all of their demand for interest-yielding 
liquidity.4 Consequently, there is no need first 
to determine the supply and demand for bank 
loans, then separately to determine the 
demand for securities by the banks and the 
supply of securities to them, and finally to 
aggregate in order to obtain the demand and 
supply of bank earning assets. The complica- 
tion in France is that the demand for commer- 
cial bank loans cannot be distinguished from 
the demand for loans from other financial 
institutions in the sphere of the Treasury.' 
4Prior to 1967, commercial banks were required to hold 
some government securities. We have taken this into 
account in the econometric analysis, though we shall 
ignore it in the discussion. 
5The most important public credit institutions under 
Treasury control include the Bank of Deposits and 
Consignations, which administers all of the funds 
collected through the savings banks, the Fund for 
Economic and Social Development, and the Land Bank 
or Credit Foncier. It should be carefully noted, however, 
that there are some publicly owned banks in France that 
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Our precise formulation of money-stock 
determination in France is easily understood 
in view of these considerations. Our model is 
shown in the following equations. (The 
symbols are defined in Appendix A.) 
Commercial bank reserves 
(1) R = Rr + Re 
Bank credit 
(2) C= Cb + C, + RD 
Commercial bank net assets 
(3) A = Cb + Re 
Commercial bank accounting identity 
(4) Cb= Db -R 
Reserve base 
(5) B = Dp, + Dsb + N + R 
Base money 
(6) Bm = B- R 
Money in the sense M4 
(7) M4 = Db + Bm 
Demand for bank credit 
C C-+ + + (8) - (1, i* dPa Yp Ytr) P P 
Supply of bank credit 
+ - + + + 
(9) C= C(i, i, X, r, F, CFD, YP) + C, 
Commercial bank demand for net 
assets 
(10) A = A(i, i1, X, r, F, CFD, YP) 
Equation of the ratio of money to net 
assets 
M4 I 1 - + ?I + 
A 1 -r + {4 (i I, X, r YP r 
where t14 = Bm/Db 
Demand for money 
(12) M= (Yp, dPa) P P 
Reaction function of the monetary 
authorities + 
FF FF - DM 
(13) = -(FX, $XX))+ TAR 
Price level equation 
P(FF (14) P = Pt$)+ Px 
Exogenous variables: C, CFD, DM/$, i*, 
ill, Pxl dPa Ir, TAR, X Ypi Ylr, A. 
Endogenous variables: A, C, F, FF/$, i, 
M4, P. 
As can be seen from this system of equa- 
tions, we introduce a demand and supply of 
bank loans inclusive of the loans of the 
financial institutions in the Treasury sphere 
as well as those of the commercial banks (see 
equation (2)). These represent the aggregate 
demand and supply of bank credit in the 
analysis (equations (8) and (9)). Then we use 
a separate behavioral relation (equation (10)) 
to determine the commercial banks' contribu- 
tion to this supply of bank credit, minus their 
rediscounts and plus their demand for excess 
legal reserves, or the banks' "demand for net 
assets." A fourth equation, ( 1), reflecting 
the joint behavior of commercial banks, 
households, and firms, sets the ratio of money 
to commercial bank net assets, or equivalent- 
ly, given the legal reserve requirement, the 
ratio of money to commercial bank deposits. 
Money is a very broad concept here, inclusive 
of all privately held government debts with a 
fixed nominal price (previously referred to as 
government monetary liabilities), that is, 
postal checking accounts and deposits at the 
savings banks as well as currency plus all 
commercial bank deposits. The advantage of 
this broad measure of money, M4, is that the 
function t14 ( ) of equation ( 11) conse- 
quently refers to the competitive position of 
the commercial banks relative to the govern- 
ment in the issue of deposits and currency. 
The previous four behavioral equations 
together determine bank credit, the interest 
rate on bank credit, commercial bank net 
assets, and money in the sense M4. 
In line with the monetary approach, the 
additional presence of a demand for money 
(equation (12)) serves to determine official 
should be viewed as ordinary members of the commercial 
banking system. As all students of the French monetary 
system agree, these are the three nationalized commer- 
cial banks (Credit Lyonnais, Banque Nationale de Paris, 
and Societe Generale), the branch system of Agricultural 
Banks, and the branch system of Popular Banks. For a 
few other prominent studies of the French system, see the 
works of Antoine Coutiere and Jacques-Henri David 
reprinted in the Commissariat General au Plan. Also see 
Andre Fourcans, and Patrick Artus. 
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reserves un'der fixed rates or the foreign 
exchange rate under floating rates. Equation 
(13), the official reaction function, permits us 
to view official reserves and the foreign 
exchange rate as simultaneously determined. 
The final equation, (14), ties the price level to 
the foreign exchange rate, and thereby admits 
the influence of the foreign exchange rate on 
the demand for money and the demand for 
credit. Without this last influence, the impact 
of the foreign exchange rate in the model 
would depend solely on the preoccupation of 
the authorities with the value of the franc in 
setting their net foreign reserves. 
The signs above the variables of the funda- 
mental equations (8)-(14) relate to the 
partial derivatives. A few points in the formu- 
lation of these equations may be clarified. The 
cost of foreign borrowing in the demand for 
credit, equation (8), is simply the foreign 
interest rate i*, and not the sum of this rate 
and the forward premium on the franc, 
because earlier tests indicated that this 
forward premium is statistically insignificant. 
In equation (9), the cumulative fiscal deficit 
(CFD) is an argument, rather than the Trea- 
sury source component of the base, because 
the Treasury source component implicitly 
depends on the amount of base money, M4 - 
Db (or B - R), and cannot be viewed as 
exogenous. For instance, the Bank of Deposits 
and Consignations in the Treasury sphere 
holds a large volume of securities which, 
based on the model and all evidence, varies 
with the demand for base money. Permanent 
real income Yp is also an argument in equa- 
tion (9) because it may affect 614 in equation 
(11). If Yp should lower this ratio, for exam- 
ple, thus raising the commercial banks' share 
of the market for issues of deposits, it would 
obviously raise the supply of credit. Equation 
(9) thus is a partially reduced form. This is 
also true of equation (10), which equals C( ) 
in the supply of credit minus the desired value 
of net borrowed reserves RD - Re.6 
The signs of i, i1, and r in the functional 
relation /4 ( ) of equation (11) rest on the 
hypothesis that any rise in the profitability of 
asset expansion will induce the commercial 
banks to offer more services to their deposi- 
tors. A rise in X, on the other hand, will raise 
Vt4, even though necessitating more commer- 
cial bank services (X being a certain legal 
disadvantage of the commercial banks rela- 
tive to the savings banks with respect to the 
amount of interest they can pay and certain 
tax regulations). Permanent income Yp possi- 
bly affects 414 because the income elasticity of 
the private demand for commercial bank 
deposits may differ from the income elasticity 
of the private demand for base money. 
There are two fundamental omissions in 
equation (12), the demand for money: the 
foreign interest rate i* (with or without the 
forward premium on the franc); and the 
money rate on domestic bonds. Both omis- 
sions rest on econometric considerations. We 
were unable to find a significant negative 
coefficient of i* in the simultaneous equation 
estimates of the demand for money (though 
we succeeded in doing so in the single equa- 
tion estimates), and we also found that antic- 
ipated inflation dominated the money rate on 
domestic bonds in the estimates of the 
demand for money (see Melitz, 1976a). 
Equation (13) says that the foreign ex- 
change rate FF/$ is equal to the target rate 
under fixed exchange rates, prior to 1971.4, 
and since then equal to 
FF FF DM 
$ (Fl ~ 1~) 
The hypothetical negative sign of F in the 
function means that in case of a downward 
pressure on the franc, the French authorities 
prefer a combination of a rise in FF/$ and a 
fall in F to merely one or the other. The 
DM/$ in the reaction function refers to the 
influence of the Common Market "snake." 
The separate presence of F implies the possi- 
ble French absence from the snake. If the fit 
of the equation is good, the official presence 
or absence of France in the snake can be 
explained by the equation. 
As regards the price level equation, (14), 
the exogenous component PJ refers partly to 
the influence of foreign prices of traded 
goods, partly to the influence of French prices 
of nontraded goods (since these prices may be 
6For a detailed discussion of the relation between 
C( ) and A( ), see Melitz (1976b, Part 1, pp. 56-58), 
which contains an econometric study of the same model 
of the French monetary system with F and FF/$ as 
exogenous. 
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independent of the foreign exchange rate to 
some extent), and partly to changes in the 
relative weights of the two. 
The only uncomfortable aspect of the 
system is the view that anticipated inflation 
dPa is exogenous. But a very delicate problem 
confronted us in this respect. To have treated 
dPa differently, or as dependent on P, thus 
FF/$, would have been to allow the errors in 
the fitted values of FF/$ to distort the fitted 
values for anticipated inflation as well as 
those of P during the period of fixed exchange 
rates, covering three-quarters of our observa- 
tions. The distortion then would have 
persisted during the early part of the period of 
flexible rates because of distributed lag 
effects of P on dPa. It seemed to us wiser, 
therefore, to accept the element of simulta- 
neous equation bias (affecting only the tail 
end of the period) which is inherent in the 
treatment of anticipated inflation as exoge- 
nous. 
We studied three other measures of money 
besides M4, namely, Ml, M2, and M3; but 
space limitations will confine the discussion of 
the econometric results to one, M1. Therefore 
we shall specify the adaptation of the model 
only to this one other money measure (though 
the adaptation to the other two, M2 and M3, 
will become apparent).7 
Let Ml be privately held currency plus 
demand deposits, or 
(7') Ml = M4-Dsb-Dbs 
where Dsb are the savings deposits with the 
savings banks, Dbs those with the commercial 
banks, and Dsb + Dbs total savings deposits. 
Instead of equation (1 1), we then have 
(11') Ml 1 A I I 
= 
~+ 4t'( ) A I -r l-r 
where = DPO + N- Dbs 
Db 
The problem then is to show, in line with 
A1=A(,il,A,X, Y.) 
A rise in i will lead commercial banks to try to 
attract deposits on previous grounds, thus 
lowering the ratio of currency plus postal 
checking accounts to their deposits. Since law 
permits these banks to increase the interest 
they pay on certain types of savings deposits, 
but not to pay any interest on checking 
accounts, their efforts to raise their deposits 
will partly provoke a rise in the ratio of their 
savings deposits, Dbs/Db, which will then 
reinforce the fall in i/'. The positive signs of i, 
and r in 4f1 ( ) follow on the same ground. As 
regards the sign of X, deposits at the savings 
banks are closer substitutes for savings depos- 
its at the commercial banks than they are for 
either currency or checking accounts. Conse- 
quently a rise in X will raise (Dm, + N)/Db, 
lower Dbs/Db, and therefore raise 611. 
The demand for money in the sense M, 
may be stated as 
(12') Ml Ml + (12-) P P (YP, dPU,d) 
where id is the interest rate on savings depos- 
its. Equations ( 1') and (12') then can substi- 
tute for (I 1) and (12) in the case of M1. 
II. The Method of Estimation 
There are three basic problems in estimat- 
ing the system of equations (8)-(14). The 
first concerns the missing series P, in the price 
level equation. We handled this difficulty by 
identifying P. with the sum of the constant 
and the disturbance term (aO + At) in the 
equation 
(14') P = aO + al-1 + ?u 
In other words, we broke up P between P, and 
a,FF/$ on the basis of a one-stage least 
squares estimate of equation (14'), and next 
substituted P, + a,FF/$ for P in equations 
(8) and (12). In this way, we reduced the 
system to six equations before engaging in 
simultaneous equation estimation. This poses 
an obvious risk of simultaneous equation bias 
7M2 is currency plus total commercial bank deposits, 
and M3 is currency plus demand deposits plus savings 
deposits with either the commercial banks or the savings 
banks that are low-interest yielding and without any 
maturity date. 
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in the estimate of a,. But the procedure has 
the fundamental merit of assuring that the 
differences between the observed and esti- 
mated values of P in the simultaneous equa- 
tion estimates derive strictly from differences 
between the observed and estimated values of 
FF/$. There would be no point in admitting 
errors in the estimates of P stemming from 
any other source in a test of the monetary 
approach as such. Our single equation esti- 
mate of equation (14') involves a highly 
significant coefficient a, (with a t-statistic of 
4.7). 
Our second estimation problem is that 
several of our equations are not linear with 
respect to all of the endogenous variables. 
This is true for equation (8) because of the 
expression C/(P, + a FF/$), for equation 
(12) because of the expression M/(Px + 
a,FF/$), and for equation ( 11) because of the 
expressions M/A and i/(l - r). The problem 
could not be resolved by stating all of the 
equations in log-linear form, since the effects 
of F and CFD in the supply of credit and the 
demand for net assets (equations (9) and 
(10)) are genuinely linear rather than log- 
linear. Moreover, the linear form of the 
demand for credit in France happens to yield 
substantially better fits than the log-linear 
form. We therefore formulated all of the 
equations linearly, using linear approxima- 
tions to the four previous expressions. 
Our third problem involves the difficulty of 
treating official reserves in the reaction func- 
tion (equation (13)) as endogenous for only 
part of the observation period. Using FX 
instead of F in the reaction function does not 
resolve this problem fully, as it may seem to, 
since we cannot consider FX (which is zero 
until 1971.4 and then becomes equal to offi- 
cial reserves) as an endogenous variable as 
distinct from F. Hence, we were compelled to 
substitute F - F(1 - X) for FX in equation 
(1 3), interpret F as endogenous, -F(1 - X) 
as exogenous, and constrain both F and -F 
(1 - X) to have the same coefficient. This 
procedure works perfectly with flexible 
exchange rates when X = 1 and therefore 
-F(1 - X) is zero. But under fixed rates 
when X = 0, the sum of F and -F(1 - X) 
does not yield zero as we would like, since F is 
the estimate of official reserves, -F(1 - X) 
the negative of the observed value of official 
reserves, and F - F(1 - X) therefore the 
error in the estimate. This error then becomes 
a factor distorting our estimates of the 
exchange rate in the period of fixed rates. We 
found this distortion impossible to avoid; in 
other words, we found no way to suppress the 
simultaneity of the estimates of F and FF/$ 
for any subsection of the study period. Fortu- 
nately, however, the errors in the estimates of 
FF/$ are only moderate under fixed rates. 
Two-thirds of them are within 2 percent and 
with only one close exception all of the rest 
are within 5 percent. 
As regards the structure of the distributed 
lags, we admitted a fairly short adaptation 
period in all of the equations except for the 
demand for credit. Earlier experiments with 
Almon lags showed that there was no point in 
deviating from a simple Fisherine assumption 
of a linear decay in influence. Accordingly, 
we imposed a linearly declining pattern of 
distributed lags everywhere lasting four quar- 
ters, except in the demand for credit where 
they last twelve, and of course, in the reaction 
function where the adjustment supposedly 
takes place in a single quarter. There are a 
few exceptions: Y,, in the demand for credit 
and r in equations (25) and (26) are all 
supposed to exert their full effect in a single 
quarter. 
We also introduced a dummy variable in all 
six equations for the third quarter of 1969, 
when France devalued by 10 percent under 
fixed rates. The relevant theory of the deter- 
mination of F does not apply in that quarter. 
Further, it proved useful to inject the dummy 
variable X in all of the equations, not only 
(13). The variable X always has a highly 
significant coefficient and its presence dimin- 
ishes the standard errors of some of the other 
coefficients without much affecting their 
levels. The simplest interpretation is that X 
compensates for a bias issuing from the errors 
in our estimates of FF/$ under fixed 
exchange rates. 
The computer program at our disposal 
(Clifford Wymer's well-known RESIMUL) 
enabled us to estimate the system with full- 
information maximum likelihood (FIML) 
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subject to all of the desired linear restric- 
tions. 
III. The Econometric Analysis 
The FIML estimates are shown in Appen- 
dix B, together with explanatory material 
relating to measures, data, statistical magni- 
tudes, and the meaning of test statistics. We 
simplify to the utmost by ignoring the dummy 
variable for 1963.3 (which proved utterly 
insignificant), the dummy variable for flexi- 
ble exchange rates in the first five equations 
of the Appendix, and the insignificant coeffi- 
cient of r (more precisely r/(l - r)) in the At 
function (which we set at zero in the esti- 
mates). The Appendix shows the predeter- 
mined coefficient of the influence of the 
exchange rate on the price level to be 0.06 
(with a t-statistic of 4.7 in the single equation 
estimate, as we mentioned before). This 
corresponds to an exchange rate elasticity of 
the price level of 0.2 at the means, which is 
not as small as it may seem, since the effect is 
over a single quarter.8 
The coefficient of the influence of Y. on 
M4/A (in equation ( 11)) is negative and 
significant, which theoretically implies a posi- 
tive effect of Y. in the supply of bank credit 
and the demand for net assets. However, we 
encountered a considerable problem of multi- 
collinearity between Y., F, and CFD in these 
two equations. With Y. as a factor in both 
equations, the coefficients of F vary greatly 
from one measure of money to the next, they 
are generally unreliable, and the reduced 
form is largely shorn of interest. Thus, we 
report only on the FIML estimates without Y" 
in equations (9) and (10). 
These estimates, or the ones in Appendix B, 
are quite satisfactory on the whole. The only 
major exception is the coefficient of the inter- 
est rate i in the demand for bank credit in the 
model with Ml, which is insignificant and of 
the wrong sign. The coefficient is negative 
and significant, however, in all of the esti- 
mates with the other money measures (M2 
and M3 as well as M4). Another bothersome 
result is the insignificance of the legal reserve 
requirement r (which first appeared in France 
only in 1971 ) in the supply of credit. But this 
is less embarrassing than it may seem, since a 
rise in r necessitates more refinancing (RD) 
at any given level of deposits and in this 
respect tends toward a positive sign of r in this 
equation. On the other hand, the negative 
effect of r in the demand for net assets, about 
which there is no theoretical ambiguity, is 
amply confirmed in the estimates. 
The enormous t-value of DM/$ in the 
reaction function is not surprising because of 
the occasional official French presence in the 
European Economic Community (EEC) 
snake. The real mark of the success of the 
equation, therefore, is the equally high t-value 
of the coefficient of F. Since the coefficient of 
DM/$ does not differ significantly from one, 
the conclusion is that, ceteris paribus, the 
French authorities try to keep the DM/FF 
exchange rate about the same. However, 
being that F clearly is another official consid- 
eration, the periods when France is in the 
EEC snake evidently correspond to those 
when keeping the franc moving in perfect step 
with the DM relative to the dollar requires 
little change in reserves. 
We do not provide the R2 for FF/$ in 
Appendix B since, as explained there, this 
statistic would have no interest: three-quar- 
ters of the observations in the study period 
concern fixed exchange rates. Instead, we 
have constructed a special R2 relating to 
FF/$ and F during the period of flexible 
exchange rates (see Appendix B). These R2s, 
in combination with the others in the appen- 
dix, yield two basic conclusions: first, that the 
model explains F and FF/$ less well than the 
other four endogenous variables;9 second, that 
8With only thirteen quarterly observations at our 
disposal, we tried but could not find any statistically 
significant pattern of distributed lags in the influence of 
FF/$ on P. Our 0.2 estimate of the exchange rate 
elasticity is in line with the estimates of Dornbusch and 
Paul Krugman, pp. 568-73, for various countries, includ- 
ing France. 
9There may be some hesitation about this conclusion 
on the ground that all of our estimates are interdepen- 
dent; therefore the estimates of F and FF/$ could even be 
the source of the high R2s for the other variables. But we 
know from FIML estimates of equations (8)-(1 1) alone 
for the same study period (see Melitz, 1976b, 1977) that 
the quality of our estimates of C, i, A, and M4 or M, owes 
nothing to the fitted values of P, F, and FF/$. This would 
then support the statement in the text. 
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FIGURE I 
the model explains these two variables better 
in the case of M1 than M4. 
It may be seen from Figures 1 and 2 that 
the profiles of the errors in the estimates of F 
and FF/$ are basically the same for Ml and 
M4. The model does not explain F particu- 
larly well in either case during the calm of 
1962.1-1968.1 when F grew steadily under 
fixed exchange rates (see Figure 1). The 
fitted values define some fictitious, sharp, 
tooth-edged movements around the basic 
upward trend during this time. The model is 
very successful, however, in tracking the 
sharp downswing in F starting with the polit- 
ical disturbances of May-June 1968 and the 
subsequent sharp upswing in F following the 
devaluation of the franc in 1969.3. It also 
anticipates the downswing of F of 1973.3 by 
one quarter and captures the timing of the 
upswing after the oil crisis in mid-1974. With 
respect to FF/$, the model traces the appre- 
ciation of the franc from 1971.4 to 1973.2 
with a certain lack of precision (see Figure 2). 
But it captures the timing of the depreciation 
of 1973.3 and the timing of the subsequent 
appreciation of 1974.1. The performance of 
the model therefore is reasonable at the turn- 
ing points and during the turbulent epi- 
sodes. 
Table 1 provides the reduced-form coeffi- 
cients of the influences on F, FF/$, and M. 
These coefficients, like the structural ones of 
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Appendix B, refer to cumulative impacts over 
time. All of the effects are distributed over 
three years, but attain 85 percent of their 
cumulative value within two years in some 
cases-namely, those involving the variables 
entering in the demand for credit (Ps, it, dPa, 
and Yp)-and more than 95 percent of their 
value within a single year in the other cases 
(DM/$, il,X, CFD, C). According to the 
model, variables which do not appear in the 
demand for money cannot affect the quantity 
of money under fixed rates. This explains all 
the null effects on Ml and M4 when X is zero 
in Table 1. 
Table 1 implies that the rate of intervention 
of the Bank of France, ii, has perverse effects 
on money, reserves, and the franc. This can 
only mean, contrary to theory, that the posi- 
tive effect of i1 on M/A dominates the nega- 
tive one on A. An important consideration in 
this regard is the large competitive presence 
of the French government in the issue of 
deposits via the system of postal checking 
accounts and the savings banks. As the 
commercial banks reduce their services to 
depositors subsequent to a rise in il, there is 
therefore wide scope in France for a rise in 
deposits with the government. (Correspond- 
ing to such a rise in deposits there is also 
necessarily lower borrowing by the Treasury 
from the Bank of France and/or net 
purchases of securities by the financial inter- 
mediaries in the sphere of the Treasury, as 
more balance sheet information would show.) 
However, these reduced-form coefficients of 
the influence of i1 can be questioned and need 
further corroboration (compare Melitz, 1977, 
Part II, p. 96). 
The other reduced-form coefficients in 
Table I accord with a priori expectations. 
Their only drawback are many wide differ- 
ences in the estimates of the influences on F 
and FF/$ depending on M4 or Ml. This is 
true for example, of the effects of P, i*, 
DM/$, and C, on F, and the effects of Px, i*, 
and C, on FF/$ (compare with the last 
paragraph of Appendix B, concerning the 
structural estimates). Despite these differ- 
ences in the results depending on the money 
measures, three major conclusions emerge 
from Table 1: 
1) Movements of official reserves offset 
about 70 percent of changes in CFD. The 
effects of CFD on money are correspondingly 
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TABLE 1--THE REDUCED-FORM COEFFICIENTS OF INFLUENCE ON F, FF/$, AND Ma 
M4 ml 
F FF/$ M F FF/$ M 
PX 
X= 1 0.18 -0.0051 3.33 0.29 -0.0086 1.60 
(4.0) (4.0) (12.7) (6.3) (6.3) (11.5) 
X= 0 0.18 - 3.44 0.31 - 1.70 
(3.9) (34.4) (6.0) (17.0) 
DM/$ 
X- 1 1.09 0.99 20.4 1.77 0.97 9.84 
(4.0) (29.5) (29.5) (6.2) (30.2) (30.2) 
i, 
X= 1 --1.48 0.043 0.88 -2.56 0.076 0.78 
(4.0) (4.0) (4.0) (7.7) (3.3) (7.4) 
X = 0 -1.52 -- 0 -2.70 -- 0 
(3.9) (7.7) 
A' 1 - 2.25 0.065 1.35 -1.33 0.040 1.35 
(5.5) (5.3) (5.3) (3.3) (3.3) (3.3) 
X=0 --2.33 - 0 --1.40 - 0 
(5.5) (3.4) A 
Y= 1 0.83 0.024 -0.49 -0.38 0.011 0.12 
(0.74) (0.74) (0.74) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) 
A' = 0 0.86 - 0 -0.40 - 0 
(0.74) (0.4) 
dPa 
X= 1 -5.14 0.15 1.2 --4.95 0.15 -6.40 
(8.6) (8.3) (0.7) (7.0) (6.8) (4.2) 
X = 0 -- 5.30 - --1.90 -- 5.22 - -7.91 
(8.7) (1.1) (7.1) (4.8) 
CFD 
X= 1 --0.71 0.021 0.43 -0.67 0.020 0.20 
(12.4) (11.5) (11.5) (14.9) (13.0) (13.1) 
X= 0 -0.74 -- 0 -0.70 - 0 
(12.4) (14.5) 
Yr 
X= 1 0.19 --0.0055 3.12 0.34 -0.010 0.93 
(3.2) (3.2) (25.6) (6.1) (6.0) (12.4) 
XX= 0 0.19 - 3.23 0.36 - 1.04 
(3.2) (26.10) (5.9) (12.6) 
C, 
X= 1 0.28 --0.0080 -0.16 0.17 -0.0050 -0.051 
(7.3) (7.0) (7.0) (5.0) (4.9) (4.9) 
X= 0 0.28 - 0 0.18 - 0 
(7.5) (5.2) 
aThe coefficients of influence refer to effects of changes in one percentage point in P, DM/$, il, i*, X, and dPa, and 
one billion francs in CFD, Yp, and C, The terms M4, Ml, and F are in units of one billion francs. These coefficients 
concern total cumulative impacts over time. See Appendix B for more information. 
moderate, those on M4 being naturally larger 
than the ones on Ml. As mentioned earlier, 
the large offset coefficients of CFD are plau- 
sible because virtually all financing of fiscal 
deficits took place through the central bank 
rather than bond issues to the private sector in 
most of the study period. According to these 
estimates then, any genuine open market 
operations in France, if they took place, would 
be offset by 70 percent or somewhat more 
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(since there would then be no diminution of 
the offset coefficient through bond financ- 
ing). 
2) The influences on official reserves 
under fixed exchange rates are only slightly, 
almost negligibly, smaller under flexible 
rates. Thus, what used to put downward 
(upward) pressure on official reserves in 
France before 1971.4 still causes virtually the 
same decrease (increase) in official reserves. 
Despite this, however, the franc was able to 
undergo all of the substantial movements in 
Figure 2. If small deviations from the levels of 
official interventions that would be required 
to keep the franc fixed cain thus bring about 
large movements in the franc, the conclusion 
can only be that the stabilizing influence of 
the franc is weak, at least in the short run, in 
line with the literature on "overshooting." 
3) Since the abandonment of fixed 
rates, the DM/$ rate has become a dramatic 
influence on official reserves, the franc, and 
money in France. This can be seen by 
comparing the coefficients of DM/$ in Table 
1, first, with the mean values of F, M4, and 
Ml in the study period (see Appendix B) and 
second, with the other coefficients in the 
table. 
In conclusion, this study may be said 
largely to constitute an attempt to rescue the 
monetary approach from a certain simplism 
in theoretical formulation and test procedure 
which could prove more damaging to it in the 
long run than any amount of criticism. The 
outcome, we hope, is a more persuasive 
confirmation of the value of the approach, 
despite a clear view of some of its limita- 
tions. 
APPENDIX A 
A -- Net commercial bank assets 
B - Reserve base 
Bm= Base money 
Cb Loans to the private sector financed 
by the commercial banks them- 
selves; or commercial bank credit in 
this sense 
C= Loans to the private sector financed 
by the public credit institutions 
under Treasury control 
CFD = The cumulative value of fiscal defi- 
cits 
Db= Commercial bank deposits 
Dp,o = Postal checking deposits 
D=b- Deposits at the national savings 
banks 
DM/$ - Price of the U.S. dollar in terms of 
the deutschmark 
F Official foreign reserves 
FF/$ Price of the U.S. dollar in terms of 
the French franc 
i - The domestic interest rate, i.e., the 
interest rate on bank credit 
i* The foreign interest rate 
il The central bank rate, i.e., bank 
rate 
M4 ---Money in the sense of currency plus 
total demand deposits (inclusive of 
postal checking accounts), and total 
savings deposits (inclusive of those 
with the state savings banks as well 
as with the commercial banks) 
N= Currency 
P= Price level 
P= Exogenous component of the price 
level 
dPa = Anticipated rate of inflation 
r R,/Db, weighted-average legal re- 
serve requirement 
R = Commercial bank reserves 
Re Commercial bank excess legal re- 
serves 
Rr = Commercial bank legally required 
reserves 
RD = Rediscounts or commercial bank 
refinancing 
TAR = Target value of FF/$ under fixed 
exchange rates 
X Dumrny variables for the system of 
flexible exchange rates 
Yp Permanent real income 
Ytr= Transitory real income 
X = The competitive legal disadvantage 
of the commercial banks relative to 
the national savings banks in the 
issue of savings deposits 
4-= Competitive position of commercial 
bank deposits relative to base 
money 
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APPENDIX B: THE FULL-INFORMATION 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF THE 
STRUCTURAL FORM 
With respect to data, we used quarterly 
averages for all stocks, interest rates, and 
foreign exchange rates. We used the three- 
month Euro-dollar rate for the foreign inter- 
est rate i*, the rate on commercial bank 
overdrafts for the rate on domestic bank 
credit i, the legal rate on traditional savings 
deposits at the savings banks (les de'pots 
traditionnels) for id, and the Bank of France's 
daily rate at the "open market" desk for the 
cost of refinancing at the central bank, i,. The 
additional interest rate expression X is the 
excess of the legal rate on the traditional 
savings deposits at the savings banks over the 
legal rate on the identical type of deposits at 
the commercial banks (les comptes sur 
livrets), plus an adjustment for the tax advan- 
tage on the interest income received from the 
savings banks. Our measure of real income Y 
is the real domestic product. The price level P 
is the implicit deflator of Y. Regarding 
permanent income and anticipated inflation, 
we used the traditional measures: 
19 0919 
Yr = 4- g) Zi] (0.9) Y, j; 
19 19 
dPa r[ (0.9)'] I (0.9)' dP_j 
The variable g in the formula for permanent 
income is an adjustment for secular growth, 
and the 0.9 coefficient in both formulas, 
which is standard, was found to perform 
better than lower decimal values in earlier 
single equation estimates of the demand for 
credit. With respect to real transitory income 
Ytr, or Y - Yp, the negative values following 
the political disturbances of May-June 1968, 
completely dominate the French series for 
1962.1 to 1974.4. Therefore we use a dummy 
variable for the last three quarters of 1968 as 
an index of Ytr. Except for the three-month 
Euro-dollar rate, which comes from the Inter- 
national Financial Statistics, our basic 
sources of statistics are the Conseil National 
du Credit and the Institut National de la 
Statistique et des Etudes Economiques. More 
information about construction of the series, 
original sources, and final data inputs, may be 
obtained directly from the authors. 
The full-information maximum likelihood 
estimates of equations (8)-(13) over 1962.1- 
1974.4 are as follows for M4: 
C (8) p + 0.06FF/$ 
-382 - 8.32i + 6.68i* 
(29) (4.21) (5.51) 
+ 13.73 dPa + 2.75 Yp5O 10 Ytr 
(5.82) (19) (2.42) 
(9) C = -268 + 45.24i -- 3.40i 
(12.6) (12.4) (1.75) 
- 26.84X + 122r + 3.58F 
(4.58) (1.30) (13) 
+ 2.16CDF+Ct 
(12.1) 
(10) A - 242 + 40.1i - 6.67i 
(13) (12.3) (3.84) 
- 16.4X - 454r + 3.41F 
(3.07) (6.3) (15.1) 
+ 2.28CFD 
(15.3) 
(11) 
-M 2.42 1 - 0.147 i 
A (21.5) 1 -r (9.1) 1 - r 
+ 0.087 l' + 0.056 
(9.24) 1 -r (1.94) 1 - r 
- 0.0055 YP 
(5.75) 1 - r 
(12) m 332 - 1.55dPa 
P, + 0.06FF/$ (28.9) (1.06) 
+ 2.63Yp 
(26.1) 
FF (13) - =3.OX-0.03FX $ (34) (37) 
1.02 DM 
+(30) $ X+TAR 
In order to interpret the coefficients of 
these equations, it is necessary to note that all 
stock and flow values are in billions of francs; 
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i, i*, i,, id, and X are in percentage points (for 
example, a 7 percent interest rate is 7.0); and 
r is in units of 100 percentage points (for 
example, a 7 percent legal reserve require- 
ment is 0.07). (This divergent treatment of r 
is in keeping with the 1 - r notation of 
equation (11).) Thus, the coefficient of i in 
equation (9), for example, says that a one 
percentage point rise in i raises the supply of 
C by 45.24 billion francs. The coefficient of r 
in this same equation says that a rise of r of 
100 percent raises the supply of C by 122 
billion francs. These are all cumulative- 
impact coefficients. The total time of 
influence, as can be seen from the text, is 
three years for equation (8) (except for Ytr), 
one year for equations (9)--(1 2) (except for r), 
and one quarter for equation (13). The mean 
values of C, A, M4, M,, and F are, respective- 
ly, 321, 193, 422, 209, and 29. The values in 
parentheses below the coefficients are ratios 
of parameter estimates to asymptotic stan- 
dard errors. (The particular FIML procedure 
supposes that all of the errors are serially 
uncorrelated but involves correction for the 
covariance of errors between equations.) 
The coefficients of determination, or R2s, 
depend on the system as a whole and not the 
quality of any single equation. For C, the R2 is 
0.990, for i it is 0.950, for A, 0.978, for M, 
0.990, and for F, 0.698. The R2 regarding 
FF/$ is meaningless for the period as a whole, 
which covers mostly fixed exchange rates. We 
have therefore constructed a special R2 for 
this variable relating strictly to the period of 
flexible exchange rates 1971.4-1974.4 (thir- 
teen observations). This we have done by 
taking one minus the sum of the squared 
errors during the subperiod divided by thir- 
teen times the variance of FF/$ during the 
period as a whole. The R2 is then 0.729. The 
comparable R2 for F over the same subperiod 
is 0.647. 
In the case of M, the FIML estimates of 
the equations are 
(8) p + 0.06FF/$ 
- 365 + 1.30i + 6.44i* 
(22) (0.40) (3.31) 
+ 7. 58dPa + 2.23Y - 6.13Ytr 
(2.18) (10.7) (2.48) 
(9') C= - 304 + 58.8i - 6.18i1 
(12.6) (12) (2.55) 
-30.26X - 80r + 3.57F 
(5.11) (0.91) (13) 
+ 2.23CFD + C, 
(11.9) 
(10') A -270 + 48.5i - 10.57i1 
(12.9) (12.3) (4.96) 
- 24.74X - 476r + 3.33F 
(4.24) (7) (14.6) 
+ 2.24CDF 
(14.3) 
,) M = 1.344 1 - 0.162 i 
A (14.5) 1 -r (10.8) 1 -r 
+ 0.078 " 0.073 X 
(9.01) 1 -r (3.15) 1 - r 
- 0.0043 Yp 
(5.45) 1 - r 
(12') = -62 - 6.4 3dPa 
PX + 0.06FF/$ (12.9) (4.82) 
+ 0.85Yp - 4.78id 
(1.46) (1.46) 
FF 
(13') 
 
= 3.14X- 0.03FX $ (34) (29.32) 
1.02 DM 
+ (31) $ X+ TAR 
The R2s, in the case, are 0.992 for C, 0.979 
for i, 0.989 for A, 0.988 for M, and 0.856 for 
F. For the subperiod of flexible exchange 
rates, the R2 for FF/$, calculated as before, is 
0.858, and that of F, 0.866. It can be seen that 
the use of M, leads to marked improvements 
in R2s for i, F, and FF/$. Also, apart from 
equations ( 11') and (12'), where we must 
expect differences depending on the money 
measure, there are notable differences in the 
structural estimates for the two money 
measures. In particular, the coefficients of i 
and dPa in the demand for credit differ in the 
two cases, that of i being insignificant and of 
the wrong sign in the case of M, but highly 
significant and of the right sign in the case of 
M4. On the other hand, i, performs notably 
better in the supply equations (9) and (10) for 
M, than M4. 
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